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CRITERIA OF LEGITIMATE RESTRICTION  
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OF PRACTICE OF THE ECHR
Abstract. The article deals with the topical questions for modern law-enforcement 
practice, which are connected with determining the lawfulness of the state’s interfer-
ence into the right to peaceful possession of property in criminal proceedings while 
applying such a measure to ensure criminal proceedings as seizure of property. It is 
noted the important role of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which sets out 
the criteria of assessing the lawfulness of interference in the property rights. The au-
thors analyze in detail these criteria – legitimacy, legitimate purpose, necessity in a 
democratic society. This analysis is made on the extensive use of the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. It is highlighted, that the development of the criteria 
of the legitimate restriction of the persons’ rights in criminal proceedings is urgent, 
because during arresting the property the legislator demands from the legislative judg-
es to take into account among others the reasonableness and proportionality of re-
straint of property rights in the criminal proceedings and to apply the least burdensome 
way of arrest, which will not result in the restraint of lawful entrepreneurship of a per-
son or other consequences which have the significant effect on the interests of others. 
On the basis of generalization of the practice of giving the rulings by the investigative 
judges on satisfaction or dismissal a satisfaction of the motion of the investigator, pros-
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the novelties and requirements of the law and practice of the ECHR, but most often dur-
ing deciding the motion of the investigator in the declaration of the ruling the standard 
argumentation of the general nature is used, the general content of the articles of the 
CPC is quoted without attempts to analyze the legality of the restriction, the purpose of 
such restriction, the proportionality of the interference of the state in the rights of a 
person, which corresponds the purpose. Meantime, it is important to have a proper 
systematic, logical, consistent argumentation, which, as a rule, is lacking in the rulings. 
The article develops and proposes a model of logical argumentation, following which 
the investigative judges will be able to formulate correctly the declaration of the ruling on 
satisfaction or dismissal a satisfaction of the motion to seizure of property. The authors 
emphasize that the legitimacy of the purpose of seizure of property is established basing 
on the requirements of the law. A measure which is objectively necessary in the presence 
of certain grounds and conditions is reasonable. Suitable is a mean by which the desired 
aim can be achieved. The measure is necessary, if there is no other, equally suitable but 
less burdensome for a person, and just it is necessary for solving an urgent social prob-
lem. Proportional may be the measure, using which the encumbrance that will be imposed 
on a person, taking into account all the circumstances and risks, will be proportionate to 
the aim, which may be achieved during applying this restriction. At the final stage, an as-
sessment is made whether the desired result, taking into account all the analyzed condi-
tions, is commensurate with the restriction of a person’s right to a peaceful possession of 
property.
In the view of the authors, the proposed model of argumentation is universal, capable 
during deciding the question of arresting of property to restrict the discretion of the law 
enforcer, to protect a person from arbitrariness of public authorities, as well as to become 
a methodological basis for making a criminal procedural decision.
Key words: inviolability of property rights; legality; measures of ensuring criminal pro-
ceedings; seizure of property, criteria for the admissibility of human rights restrictions.
In Article 41 of the Constitution of 
Ukraine it is stated that: “Everyone shall 
have the right to own, use, or dispose of 
his property and the results of his intel-
lectual or creative activities… No one 
shall be unlawfully deprived of the right 
for property. The right for private prop-
erty shall be inviolable… Confiscation 
of property may be applied only pursu-
ant to a court decision, in the cases, to 
the extent, and in compliance with the 
procedure established by law”. Thus, 
the Constitution, in establishing the in-
violability of property rights, provides 
that it is not absolute, but its restriction 
is possible only in cases provided for by 
law and solely by court decision. 
Such a provision of the Constitu-
tion correlates with the requirement of a 
number of international legal documents, 
which enshrine the principle of inviolabil-
ity of property rights. Among them there 
is the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Art. 17, Part 2 Art. 29);1 Inter-
1   Загальна декларація прав людини від 
10 December 1948 р. URL: https://zakon.rada.
gov.ua/laws/show/995_015 (дата звернення 
17.07.2019).
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national Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (Articles 2, 17);1 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (Articles 3, 4),2 Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Convention).3
In more detail, the right to respect for 
property is enshrined in the First Proto-
col to the Convention.4 This protocol was 
signed on 20 March 1952 and included 
the right to protection of property in the 
list of rights guaranteed by the Conven-
tion. Appeal to Art. 1 “The right to prop-
erty” of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention 
gives grounds to state that it contains at 
least three rules that are of importance 
to national criminal justice, to which 
scholars and practitioners have always 
drawn attention: “Every natural or legal 
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoy-
ment of his possessions. No one shall 
be deprived of his possessions except 
in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by 
the general principles of international 
law. However, the preceding provisions 
1   Міжнародний пакт про громадянські і 
політичні права від 16 December 1966 р. URL: 
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_043 
(дата звернення 17.07.2019).
2   Міжнародний пакт про економічні, со-
ціальні і культурні права від 16 December 
1966 р. URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/
show/995_042 (дата звернення 17.07.2019).
3   Конвенція про захист прав людини і 
основоположних свобод від 4 November 
1950 р. URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/
show/995_004 (дата звернення 17.07.2019 р.).
4   Перший Протокол до Конвенції про 
захист прав людини і основоположних сво-
бод від 20 Marh 1952 р. URL: https://zakon.
rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_535/ed19520320 
(дата звернення 17.07.2019 р.).
shall in no way limit the right of a State 
to enforce such laws as it deems neces-
sary to control the use of property in 
the general interest or to secure taxes or 
other charges or penalties.” (Emphasis 
ours – O. K.)5 
The European Court of Human 
Rights (hereinafter – the ECHR, Stras-
bourg Court, Court) has interpreted the 
provisions of this article, stating that 
“The first rule, which is of a general na-
ture, enounces the principle of peaceful 
enjoyment of property; it is set out in the 
first sentence of the first paragraph. The 
second rule covers deprivation of pos-
sessions and subjects it to certain condi-
tions; it appears in the second sentence 
of the same paragraph. The third rule 
recognizes that the States are entitled, 
amongst other things, to control the use 
of property in accordance with the gen-
eral interest, by enforcing such laws as 
they deem necessary for the purpose; it 
is contained in the second paragraph.6
In the case of James and Others v. 
The United Kingdom, the ECHR ex-
5   Протокол до Конвенції про захист прав 
людини і основоположних свобод зі змінами, 
внесеними Протоколом   11, ратифікований 
Законом   475/97-ВР від 17.07.97. URL: https://
zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_535 (дата 
звернення 17.07.2019).
6   ECHR decision in the case «Спорронг і 
Лоннрот проти Швеції» (Sporrong and Lon-
nroth v. Sweden), 23 September 1982, Applica-
tion no. 7151/75 and 7152/75, § 61; «Депаль 
проти Франції» (Depalle v. France), 29 March 
2010, Application no. 34044/02, § 77; «Зеленчук 
і Цицюра проти України» (Zelenchuk and 
Tsytsyura v. Ukraine), 22 May 2018, Application 
no 846/16 and 1075/16, § 56; «Андрій Руденко 
проти України» (Andriy Rudenko v. Ukraine), 
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plained the relationship between the 
three sentences above and stated that 
“The three rules are not, however, 
“distinct” in the sense of being uncon-
nected. The second and third rules are 
concerned with particular instances of 
interference with the right to peace-
ful enjoyment of property and should 
therefore be construed in the light of the 
general principle enunciated in the first 
rule.”1 The same is stated by the ECHR 
in the case of Papastavrou and Others 
v. Greece, underlining that the second 
and third rules, which are concerned 
with particular instances of interference 
with the right to peaceful enjoyment of 
property, are to be construed in the light 
of the general principle laid down in the 
first rule.2 Extrapolating the provisions 
of international documents to crimi-
nal justice, we can state that property 
rights are not absolute, which makes it 
possible to be regulated and limited by 
the state. However, in exercising such 
powers, the state must adhere to the es-
tablished principles of permissible law-
ful interference. Such legal interven-
tion should be guided by international 
standards and provisions of national 
law. In addition to the Constitution of 
Ukraine, the inviolability of property 
rights is reflected in sectoral legislation. 
In particular, Article 16 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code (CPC) provides that the 
1   ECHR decision in the case «Джеймс та 
інші проти Сполученого Королівства» 
(James and Others v. the United Kingdom), 21 
Februaru, 1986, Application no. 8793/79, § 37.
2   ECHR decision in the case  «Папаставру 
та інші проти Греції» (Papastavrou and Others 
v. Greece), 10 April 2003, Application no. 
46372/99 § 33.
deprivation or restriction of the right 
to ownership shall be made only upon 
a motivated court’s decision adopted 
as prescribed in the Code. Temporary 
arrest of property is allowed without a 
court decision on grounds and accord-
ing to the procedure prescribed in the 
Code. 
Since during the arrest of property a 
person de yure is not deprived of owner-
ship, but only temporarily, until its can-
cellation in accordance with the CPC, is 
restricted the right to alienation, disposal 
and/or use, the ECHR recognizes the ar-
rest of the property by means of control 
over the use of the property,3 and requires 
that the actions of the authorities not con-
tradict the third rule of Art. 1 of Proto-
col No. 1 to the Convention referred to 
above.
For the purpose of controlling the 
property, Protocol No. 1 gives states 
broad powers, “which they deem neces-
sary”. It is important that the rights of 
the state to interfere with the right to 
peaceful ownership of property should 
be governed by law. 
Since, as noted above, all three provi-
sions of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1, which 
positioned as interconnected rules, the 
powers that the state has to interpret 
should be systematically linked to the 
3   ECHR decisions in the cases «Раймондо 
проти Італії» (Raimondo v. Italy), 22 February 
1994, Application no. 12954/87, § 27; «Эндрюс 
проти Сполученого Королівства» (Andrews 
v. the United Kingdom), 26 September 2002, 
Application no. 49584/99; «Адамчик проти 
Польщі» (Adamczyk v. Poland), 7 November 
2006, Application no. 28551/04; «Боржонов 
проти Росії» (Borzhonov v. Russia), 22 January 
2009, Application no. 18274/04, § 57.
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second rule; therefore, state-owned prop-
erty controls must be carried out in the 
public interest.
Since, in the course of restriction of 
property rights, the state interferes with 
individual law in one way or another, 
the conditions of such interference must 
meet the requirements specified in Art. 8 
of the Convention, according to which: 
“Everyone has the right to respect for 
his private and family life. There shall 
be no interference by a public author-
ity with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and 
is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others”.
Thus, Article 8 of the Convention 
sets out the conditions under which a 
state may interfere with the exercise 
of a protected right and which are of-
ten referred to as the criteria for inter-
vention. According to the Convention, 
restrictions are permissible if they are 
“prescribed by law”, “necessary in a 
democratic society” and pursue one of 
the legitimate goals envisaged. As we 
can see, these criteria are consistent with 
the provisions, which are also contained 
in Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Conven-
tion. And it should be noted that despite 
the construction of Part 2 of Art. 8 of 
the Convention, the court assesses the 
adherence of the specified conditions 
separately by the state in the following 
order: “legality”, “legitimate purpose”, 
“necessity”.1 This is constantly stated 
in the ECHR decisions. In particular, in 
the case of Shvydka v. Ukraine, the Court 
noted that “in order for an intervention 
to be justified …, it must be “established 
by law”, pursue one or more legitimate 
goals … and be “necessary in a demo-
cratic society” – that is, proportionate the 
goal pursued”.2
Having been introduced into the 
ECHR practice, criteria for assessing 
the lawfulness of state interference with 
the rights guaranteed by the Conven-
tion were named the “three-part test”. 
3 Meanwhile, as it is well known, the 
ECHR has “borrowed” from the German 
roots in the right-to-practice practice and 
the principle of proportionality, which 
is now existing in many legal systems,4 
which, although not directly enshrined 
1   Harris, O'Boyle, and Warbrick Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (3rd 
edn, Oxford university press 2014).
2   ECHR decision in the cases «Швидка 
проти України» (Shvydka v. Ukraine), 30 Oc-
tober 2014, Application on.  17888/12, § 33. See 
also: Case of «Гладишева проти Росії» (Gla-
dysheva v. Russia), 6 December 2011, Applica-
tion on. 7097/10, § 77; «Брумереску протии 
Румунії» (Brumarescu v. Romania), 23 January 
2001, Application no. 28342/95, § 78; «Спорронг 
і Лоннрот протии Швеції» (Sporrong and Lon-
nroth v. Sweden), 23 September 1982, Applica-
tion no. 7151/75 and 7152/75, § 69–74.
3   Фулей Т. І., Застосування Конвенції про 
захист прав людини і основоположних сво-
бод та практики Європейського Суду з прав 
людини при здійсненні правосуддя (ВАІТЕ 
2017) 38.
4   Бажанов А. А., Обоснование принципа 
соразмерности в практике Федерального 
Конституционного Суда Германии (1950–
1960 гг.) (2018) 5 Вестник Университета име-
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in the Convention, is one of the most 
important principles that is part of the 
rule of law, has become the principle 
of the Convention interpretation1 and 
most commonly applied by the Court. 
Moreover, elements of this principle 
have been known in ancient times,2 its 
content has gradually evolved over sev-
eral centuries, but only nowadays it has 
received a “new breath” through consti-
tutional justice and international judicial 
institutions.
The first and most important require-
ment of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the 
1   Гюлумян В. Г., Принципы толкования 
Европейской конвенции прав человека (кри-
тика и защита) (2015) 3 (45) Журнал консти-
туционного правосудия 17; Дудаш Т. І. Прак-
тика Європейського суду з прав людини: 
герменевтичний аналіз (2009) 21 Практика 
Європейського суду з прав людини: загаль-
нотеоретичні дослідження, Серія І. Дослі-
дження та реферати 26–40; Рабінович П. М., 
Федик С. Є., Особливості тлумачення юри-
дичних норм щодо прав людини (за матері-
алами практики Європейського суду з прав 
людини) (2004) 5 Праці Львівської лаборато-
рії прав людини і громадянина Науково-до-
слідного інституту державного будівництва 
та місцевого самоврядування академії право-
вих наук України 27.
2   Бажанов А. А., Соразмерность как прин-
цип права (дис канд юрид наук, Російський 
університет дружби народів 2019); Євту-
шок Ю. О. Принцип пропорційності як необ-
хідна складова верховенства права (дис канд 
юрид наук, Університет економіки та права 
«КРОК» 2015); Погребняк С. П., Принцип 
пропорційності у судовій діяльності (2012) 2 
Філософія права і загальна теорія права 49–
50; Цакиракис С., Пропорциональность: по-
сягательство на права человека? (2011) 2 (81) 
Сравнительное конституционное обозрение 
47–51; Фоскулле А., Принцип соразмерности 
(2015) 1 (104) Сравнительное конституцион-
ное обозрение 159.
Convention is that any interference by 
the state in the unimpeded use of prop-
erty must comply with the law. 
If one tries to understand the concept 
of “law”, “provided for by law”, “in ac-
cordance with the law” used in the Con-
vention, then one should refer to the 
ECHR practice in which the Strasbourg 
Court developed a legal position and 
formed an autonomous concept of “law”. 
One of the first and most common cases 
of the ECHR in which it has been for-
mulated in these terms is the case of The 
Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom.3 
The complaint concerned a possible vio-
lation of Art. 10 of the Convention due 
to the ban by UK national courts to pub-
lish articles in the Sunday Times dedi-
cated to discussing a “high-profile” law-
suit that had not been completed yet. 
Such a ban was due to contempt of court, 
which was expressed in the fact that the 
comments in the press could be seen as 
influences and assumptions that were 
incompatible with the principle of inde-
pendence and impartiality of the court 
and the trial. One of the aspects that 
needed to be considered by the Court 
was the interpretation of the term “pro-
vided for by law” in the light of the in-
terference with the rights protected by 
the Convention. 
The ECHR, in particular, noted that: 
“The word “law” in the formula “pro-
vided for by law” covers not only stat-
utes but also unwritten law… Consider-
ing that a restriction, by virtue of com-
3   ECHR de decision sn the case ««Санді 
Таймс» проти Сполученого Королівства» 
(The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom), 26 
April 1979, Application no. 6538/74.
409
Kaplina O., Kotova O. 
Criteria of legitimate restriction of Ownership 
during property arrest in Criminal...
№ 12/2020
mon law, does not refer to “provided for 
by law” solely on the ground that it is not 
enshrined in law, and then it deprives a 
state participating in the common law 
Convention, protection… and cuts down 
the very roots of this state’s legal system. 
This would clearly contradict the inten-
tions of the drafters of the Conven-
tion…”
In the Court’s view, the following 
two requirements are followed from the 
expression “provided for by law”. First, 
the right must be adequately accessible: 
citizens must be able, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, to navigate what legal rules 
are applied to the case. Secondly, a norm 
cannot be regarded as a ‘law’ unless it is 
formulated with sufficient precision to 
enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: 
he must be able – if need be with appro-
priate advice – to foresee, to a degree that 
is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences which a given action may 
entail. These consequences need not be 
predicted with absolute certainty: expe-
rience has shown that this is unattain-
able… Accordingly, “many laws are 
inevitably couched in terms which, to a 
greater or lesser extent, are vague and 
whose interpretation and application are 
questions of practice.”1 
Thus, the ECHR has formulated sev-
eral requirements that must be satisfied 
by national law in order to comply with 
the rule of law as enshrined in the pre-
amble to the Convention and makes 
sense of the whole Convention. First, it 
1   ECHR de decision in the case ««Санді 
Таймс» проти Сполученого Королівства» 
(The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom),  26 
April 1979, Application no. 6538/74.
is a fairly broad understanding of the 
concept of “national law”, which in-
cludes not only current law but also the 
interpretation given to it by national 
courts, established practice, including 
judicial one. Secondly, it is a requirement 
concerning the “quality of the law”: ac-
cordingly to its accessibility and predict-
ability. 
The ECHR continues to recall the 
requirements of the concept of law for-
mulated in the judgment of The Sunday 
Times v. United Kingdom, complement-
ing it with new content. In particular, in 
the case of Silver and Others v. The 
United Kingdom, it was stated that “ac-
cessibility, indeed, provides an opportu-
nity to read the texts of acts containing 
rules”;2 “the principle of legality also 
provides that the applicable provisions 
of national law are accessible, clear and 
predictable in their application.”3 Since 
interference with the right of property 
borders with the possibility of arbitrary 
restriction, the state must not only ensure 
the quality of the law, but also provide 
remedies against the arbitrary interfer-
ence of the authorities in the exercise of 
the rights guaranteed by the Convention. 
Thus, “legislation must determine with 
sufficient certainty the extent of freedom 
2   ECHR de decision in the case «Сільвер та 
інші проти Сполученого Королівства» (Silver 
and Others v. the United Kingdom), 25 Marh 
1983, Application no. 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 
7061/75, 7107/75, 7113/75 and 7136/75, §§ 87–88
3   ECHR de decision in the cases «Зеленчук 
і Цицюра проти України» (Zelenchuk and 
Tsytsyura v. Ukraine), 22 May 2018, Application 
no. 846/16 and 1075/16, § 98, and «Будченко 
проти в України» (Budchenko v. Ukraine), 24 
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of action and the way in which they are 
exercised”1 and “there must be a measure 
of legal protection in domestic law 
against arbitrary interferences by public 
authorities.”2 
An example is the case of Denisova 
and Moiseyeva v. Russia, in which the 
ECHR found a violation of Art. 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 of the Convention. The 
reason for this was the seizure of the 
property (and subsequently its confisca-
tion) of his wife on the basis of a judg-
ment passed against her husband. At 
that time, the Supreme Court of the Rus-
sian Federation had already provided an 
explanation for such cases, stating that 
the confiscation of jointly-owned prop-
erty is possible only within the share of 
a spouse found guilty of a crime. Due 
to the fact that the seizure of his wife’s 
property was not “in accordance with 
the law”, the Court found a violation of 
Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Conven-
tion.3 There is another example. Latvian 
citizen V. M. Baklanov decided to move 
from Latvia to Russia, agreed with the 
realtor to buy an apartment, withdrew 
the amount of $ 250 thousand from his 
bank account and transferred this sum 
to his acquaintance B. for sending to 
Moscow. On arrival at the airport, B. 
1   ECHR de decision in the case «Маестрі 
проти Італії» (Maestri v. Italy), 17 February 
2004, Application no. 39748/98, § 30.
2   ECHR de decision in the case «Крюслен 
проти Франції» (Kruslin v. France), 24 April 
1990, Application no. 11801/85, § 30.
3   ECHR de decision in the case «Денисова 
і Мойсеєва проти Росії» (Denisova and 
Moiseyeva v. Russia), 1 April 2010, Application 
no. 16903/03, §§ 55–65.
without specifying the amount in the 
customs declaration at the passage of 
customs control was detained. He was 
charged with smuggling, and subse-
quently he was sentenced to two years 
of probation. The court ordered the 
funds stored in the customs terminal to 
be converted into government revenue 
as a smuggling item. The ECHR, having 
considered the case, noted that the first 
and most important requirement of Art. 
1 of Protocol No. 1 is that any interfer-
ence by public authorities in the peace-
ful possession of property should be 
lawful; deprivation of property is pos-
sible only “under the conditions pro-
vided by law”. In assessing compliance 
with the law in this case, the European 
Court has stated, among other things 
that, according to the law, the instru-
ments of crime belonging to the ac-
cused, money and other objects of crime 
are subject to seizure. (Emphasis ours – 
O. K.) Meanwhile, no one was alleged, 
nor was there any evidence that the ap-
plicant’s money had been “illegally ac-
quired”. Taking into account failure to 
bring legal provisions before national 
courts as grounds for withdrawing a 
substantial sum of money and the ap-
parent contradictions of the case law 
regarding national legislation, the Court 
noted that the national legislation at is-
sue had not been formulated with such 
precision that the applicant could have 
foreseen the consequences of his ac-
tions to the extent reasonable to the cir-
cumstances of the case. Therefore, the 
interference with the applicant’s prop-
erty could not be regarded as legitimate 
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in the sense of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 
of the Convention, and consequently 
there has been a violation thereof.1 
Thus, this makes it possible to con-
clude that since the mechanism of the 
protection of rights provided by the Con-
vention is subsidiary in comparison with 
the protection at the national level, and 
the ECHR does not replace the national 
courts. That is why the regulatory poten-
tial of the law is of key importance. The 
state at national level should create safe-
guards to protect the rights of the person 
against arbitrary interference during, 
inter alia, the seizure of property in crim-
inal proceedings, which necessitates the 
adoption of the relevant legislation, and 
the quality of the law, which imposes 
additional obligations on the state, aimed 
at preventing the defects of the criminal 
procedural legislation, creating a clear 
and predictable procedure, and the mech-
anism of the court appeal of the lawful-
ness of the intervention, is of particular 
importance. 
In order that the interference with the 
property right was legitimate in the sense 
of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Con-
vention, as stated above and follows 
from the second rule of Art. 1, it should 
be carried out in the public interest. The 
ECHR will consider the existence of a 
legitimate purpose for interfering with 
the property after the legality of the in-
tervention has been established. As the 
ECHR recalled in the case of Treguben-
ko v. Ukraine, the court reiterates that 
1   ECHR de decision in the case «Бакланов 
проти Росії» (Baklanov v. Russia),  9 July 2005, 
Application nо. 68443/01, § 39–46.
deprivation of property can only be jus-
tified if it is shown, inter alia, in the 
“public interest” and the “conditions 
provided for by law”. Moreover, any in-
terference with property rights must nec-
essarily comply with the principle of 
proportionality. As the Court has repeat-
edly stated, a “fair balance” should be 
maintained between the requirements of 
the general interest of society and the 
requirements of the protection of funda-
mental human rights, and that “the nec-
essary balance will not be respected if 
the person concerned carries an “indi-
vidual and excessive burden”, moreover, 
“the correct application of the law is un-
doubtedly of public interest.”2 
In the case of Sukhanov and Ilchenko 
v. Ukraine, it was also stated that “the 
first and foremost rule of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 is that any interference 
by public authorities with the right to 
peaceful possession of property should 
be lawful and should pursue a legitimate 
purpose in the interests of society”.3 
Moreover, an analysis of the ECHR’s 
practices makes it possible to conclude 
that in determining the lawfulness of the 
purpose of the intervention, the Court 
gives states the discretion,4 since it is the 
2   ECHR de decision in the case «Трегубен-
ко проти України» (Tregubenko v. Ukraine), 2 
November 2004, Application no. 61333/00, 
§ 53–54.
3   ECHR de decision in the case «Суханов 
та Ільченко проти України» (Sukhanov and 
Ilchenko v. Ukraine), 26 June 2014, Application 
no. 68385/10 та 71378/10, § 53.
4   ECHR de decision in the case «Олcсон 
проти Швеції (  1)» (Olsson v. Sweden (  1)), 
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authorities themselves that are more 
aware of the needs of their society, and 
are therefore more favorably placed 
than the judge of the ECHR in assessing 
the public interest of their country. Su-
pervision of the ECHR in this part is 
limited to cases of abuse of power and 
blatant mischief.
With regard to such a component as 
the possibility of restricting rights to the 
extent necessary in a democratic society, 
the ECHR explained that, taking into 
account the case-law of the ECHR, “the 
notion of necessity implies that the in-
terference corresponds to a pressing so-
cial need and, in particular, that it is pro-
portionate to the legitimate purpose 
pursued.”1 The ECHR noted that “whilst 
the adjective “necessary”… is not syn-
onymous with the adjective “indispens-
able”, neither has it the flexibility of such 
expressions as “admissible”, “ordinary”, 
“useful”, “reasonable” or “desirable”.2 
The ECHR also developed the com-
ponents to be assessed in determining 
whether interference was necessary in 
a democratic society: the importance of 
protected rights; the nature of a demo-
cratic society; the possibility of a Eu-
ropean and international consensus; the 
importance and objective nature of the 
protected interest; the availability of a 
judicial evaluation of the intervening 
interest. 
1   ECHR de decision in the case «Олcсон 
проти Швеції (  1)» (Olsson v. Sweden (1)), 
24 Marh 1988, Application no. 10465/83, § 58.
2   ECHR de decision in the case «Хендісайд 
проти Сполученого Королівства» (Handyside 
v. the United Kingdom), 7 December 1976, 
Application no. 5493/72, § 48.
Within this criterion of admissibil-
ity of interference with a person’s right, 
the proportionality is assessed between 
the need for interference with human 
rights in a democratic society and the 
possibility of securing a legitimate pur-
pose during the intervention. As the 
ECHR stated in the above-mentioned 
Decision in the case of Sukhanov and 
Ilchenko v. Ukraine: “Any interference 
should also be proportionate to the ob-
jective pursued. In other words, a “fair 
balance”” should be struck between the 
general interests of society and the duty 
to protect the fundamental rights of the 
individual. The necessary balance will 
not be achieved if the individual or per-
sons are burdened with personal and 
excessive burden.”3 
Therefore, interference with indi-
vidual rights is disproportionate if it 
does not lead to the achievement of le-
gitimate purposes. The resolution of the 
issue of proportionality is often about 
balancing the various factors, which is 
often difficult for both the ECHR itself 
and law enforcers trying to justify their 
interference with the rights of individu-
als. The ECHR often speaks of a “fair 
balance” between the interests of soci-
ety and the interests of the individual, 
but finding that balance is very difficult. 
In other words, human rights restric-
tions applied by the state should be pro-
portionate to the content and scope of 
the law itself and may not be so severe 
3   ECHR de decision in the case «Суханов 
та Ільченко проти України» (Sukhanov and 
Ilchenko v. Ukraine), 26 June 2014, Application 
no. 68385/10 and 71378/10, § 53.
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or violate the very essence of the law. 
For example, in the case of Bokova 
v. Russia, a complaint was filed by a 
citizen Bokova that after convicting 
her husband and his accomplices for 
committing particularly large-scale 
fraud, the perpetrators were obliged to 
pay more than USD 9 million to the 
victim. Due to the need to secure a 
civil suit, the house of Bokova was 
arrested. Not receiving legal protection 
at the national level, the applicant ap-
pealed to the ECHR, which in her de-
cision stated, inter alia, that she had 
obtained the house prior to the crimi-
nal activity of her husband, and there-
fore had a legitimate reason to demand 
the abandonment of at least a part of 
it, namely the part which was not sub-
jected to repair at the expense of a 
man’s criminal proceeds. In addition, 
the decision to confiscate the house 
was not accompanied by sufficient 
procedural safeguards to avoid arbi-
trariness, as no domestic court exam-
ined the amount of the proceeds of the 
crime, and did not give the applicant 
the opportunity to present arguments 
regarding the protection of his share 
of the property. This approach has led 
the ECHR to unanimously acknowl-
edge the violation of Art. 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 of the Convention.1 Therefore, 
it can be seen that the interference with 
the applicant’s property rights was dis-
proportionate to the purpose pursued 
by the state authorities. The applicant 
was subjected to undue burdens, had 
1   ECHR de decision in the case «Бокова 
проти Росії» (Bokova v. Russia), 16 April 
2019, Application no.  27879/13, § 54, 59.
an undue influence on her property 
rights, and was not provided with any 
procedural safeguards to protect her 
property. 
As it was stated above, the right to 
peaceful possession of property is a 
fundamental right, but it is not absolute 
and may be limited under certain condi-
tions, but a violation of Art. 1 of Proto-
col No. 1 of the Convention will take 
place when it is established a significant 
imbalance, a disproportionate effect 
“between the means employed and the 
aim sought to be realized”.2 
For a more thorough understanding 
of the essence of the principle of propor-
tionality, we should turn to modern doc-
trinal approaches to its understanding.3 
If, as noted above, the ECHR uses 
the following stages of lawfulness re-
striction assessment: “legality”, “le-
gitimate purpose”, “necessity in a 
2   ECHR de decision in the cases «Джеймс 
та інші проти Сполученого Королівства» 
(James and Others v. the United Kingdom,), 
21 February 1986, Application no. 8793/79, 
§ 50, and ««East/West Alliance Limited» 
проти України» (East/West Alliance Limited 
v. Ukraine), 23 January 2014, Application 
no. 19336/04, § 168.
3   Barak A., Proportionality. Constitutional 
Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 638. Бажанов А. А., 
Проблемы реализации принципа соразмер-
ности в судебной практике (2018) 6 (т. 13) 
Труды Института государства и права РН 
124–157; Коэн-Элия М., Порат И., Амери-
канский метод взвешивания интересов и 
немецкий тест на пропорциональность: ис-
торические корни (2011) 3 Сравнительное 
конституционное обозрение 59–81; Погреб-
няк С. П., Принцип пропорційності у судо-
вій діяльності (2012) 2 Філософія права і 
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democratic society”, then scholars 
propose their own vision of algorith-
mizing lawfulness assessment activi-
ties. In particular, A. Barak distin-
guishes four elements (stages) of the 
proportionality test: 1) identification 
of the legitimate purpose of law re-
striction; 2) determining the existence 
of a rational link between the legiti-
mate purpose and the means chosen to 
achieve it (the relevance of the means 
employed); 3) assessment of the neces-
sity of the measures applied; 4) com-
paring the benefits of achieving a le-
gitimate purpose and the limitations to 
which human rights have been sub-
jected (proportionality in a narrow 
sense or “weighing”).1 
There are approaches according to 
which the number of steps proposed by 
A. Barak is reduced to two, but there 
are criteria for determining the propor-
tionality of the intervention.2 
Thus, as we can see, basic details 
of the proportionality principle of the 
legitimacy determination of human 
rights restriction, which are developed 
in the doctrine, applied in national le-
1    Barak A. Proportionality. Constitutional 
Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 638; Бажанов А. А., 
Проблемы реализации принципа соразмер-
ности в судебной практике (2018) 6 (т. 13) 
Труды Института государства и права 
РН 129.
2   Коэн-Элия М., Порат И., Американ-
ский метод взвешивания интересов и не-
мецкий тест на пропорциональность: исто-
рические корни (2011) 3 Сравнительное 
конституционное обозрение 61; Погреб-
няк С. П., Принцип пропорційності у судо-
вій діяльності (2012) 2 Філософія права і 
загальна теорія права 51.
gal systems and used in the ECHR, are 
the same. 
Consideration of the issues raised 
above becomes even more relevant in 
view of the fact that Art. 173 of the CPC 
provides that in deciding whether to 
seize property, the court should take 
into account, inter alia, the reasonable-
ness and proportionality of the restric-
tion of ownership to the task of criminal 
proceedings. In addition, if the investi-
gator’s request for the seizure of the 
property is satisfied, the court should 
apply the least onerous manner of arrest 
that will not result in the suspension or 
undue restriction of the person’s legiti-
mate business activity or other conse-
quences that significantly affect the 
interests of others (Para. 5 Part 2, Part 
4, Art. 173 of the CPC). So, as we can 
see, the domestic legislator tried to 
unify the international legal standards 
contained in Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 of 
the Convention and national practice to 
ensure that the rights of the seized per-
son are respected. Such a move by the 
legislator is a positive one, since the 
ECHR, as mentioned above, states that 
it is for the state to establish the goals 
of interference with the exercise of in-
dividual rights of the individual and to 
determine a fair balance between the 
needs of such intervention and the gen-
eral interests of society. Criminal pro-
ceedings belong to those types of state 
activity where the possibility of using 
coercion permeates all its stages and 
proceedings, facilitates the exercise of 
evidentiary activity, is a means of en-
suring the participants in criminal pro-
ceedings of their duties, etc. Therefore, 
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it is inevitable to raise awareness of the 
criteria for the legitimacy of the rights 
restriction of persons in criminal pro-
ceedings, including whilst the arrest of 
property, as well as their widespread 
implementation in law enforcement 
practice. 
Referring to the practice of national 
courts shows that judges are gradually 
adopting the new legal requirements and 
requirements. Cases with reference to 
Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Conven-
tion in the rulings on the satisfaction or 
satisfaction refusal of the investigator’s 
request for the arrest of property. As a 
positive trend, it should be noted that in 
some rulings investigative judges try to 
make an argument and evaluate the pro-
portionality of the means of limiting the 
rights of the person being pursued, but 
such argumentation is very lapidary; the 
components of the proportionality test 
are not analyzed in detail, judges do not 
explain exactly how public interest is 
compared, the purpose the law enforcer 
wants to achieve and the rights of the 
individual.
In particular, having considered the 
request of the investigator for the arrest 
of “movable and immovable property” 
in the case, which was initiated on the 
grounds of the crime under Part 3 of Art. 
212 of the Criminal Code “Tax evasion, 
fees (mandatory payments)”, the inves-
tigating judge concluded that it was nec-
essary to refuse to grant the request of 
the investigator and in the ruling stated 
that “the investigators were not provided 
with adequate and admissible evidence 
by the court that in this criminal proceed-
ing any person was informed of suspi-
cion, the possibility of using property as 
evidence in criminal proceedings, since 
the petition is based only on the assump-
tion of tax evasion of this individual, the 
court has also not proved the reasonable-
ness and proportionality of the restriction 
of ownership by the criminal proceed-
ings. Since… seizure of… the account 
will completely stop the activity… of the 
individual and because of the inability to 
purchase poultry feed will lead to its ma-
turity, that is, it will have irreversible 
consequences…”1 
Another order of the investigating 
judge stated: “the petition does not spec-
ify the basis and purpose of seizure of 
the vehicle in accordance with Art. 170 
of the CPC of Ukraine and the necessity 
of such arrest is not duly substantiated. 
And the need for an examination is not 
a basis for taking such a measure to se-
cure criminal proceedings as seizure of 
property. In addition, according to Part 
4 of Art. 173 of the CPC of Ukraine, the 
investigating judge, the court is obliged 
to apply in such a way the seizure of 
property, which will not lead to the sus-
pension or undue restriction of the le-
gitimate business activity of the person, 
or other consequences that significantly 
affect the interests of other persons. 
Thus, the imposition of arrest implies the 
deprivation of the right to alienate, dis-
pose and/or use the property, so in the 
case of arrest of a car owned and used in 
the business activity of JSC Iceberg in 
1   Ухвала слідчого судді Ужгородського 
міськрайонного суду від 23 February 2017 р., 
справа   308/1740/17. URL:. http://reyestr.court.
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the form of LLC, it may lead to a re-
striction of legitimate business activity 
of the company… the court was not 
provided with adequate and admissible 
evidence that there were risks that the 
individual entrepreneur PERSON_3 
may conceal, lose, transfer, alienate it, 
since during this period he had suffi-
cient time and opportunities to dispose 
of the funds from the stated accounts of 
the petition.” In view of the foregoing, 
the judge denied the application.1 
Meanwhile, it should be noted that 
in the motivating part of the decisions 
of investigative judges, the standard 
argumentation of the general nature is 
most often applied, the relevant parts 
of Art. 170–174 of the CPC, there are 
formal criteria without attempting to 
introduce a discretionary scheme, 
which undoubtedly are grounds for sat-
isfaction or refusal to grant a request, 
but the proper systematic, logical, con-
sistent reasoning, which is usually lack-
ing, is important. Certainly, it is not 
easy to construct such a sequence, but 
based on the ECHR’s practice and the 
above approaches of scholars, we will 
try to offer a model of argumentation 
algorithm that can be used by the inves-
tigating judge when considering a mo-
tion for seizure of property, as well as 
by an investigator in making a request 
for seizure of property. In our view, the 
value of developing such an algorithm 
is obvious. The use of coercion per-
1   Ухвала слідчого судді Берегівського 
районного суду Закарпатської області від 
26 June 2017 р., справа   297/1390/17. URL: 
http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/67410143 
(дата звернення: 20.06.2019).
vades all criminal proceedings by virtue 
of its specificity, so the question arises 
about determining the admissibility cri-
teria for restricting the rights of persons 
involved in criminal proceedings and 
using them in petitioning for the seizure 
of property, as well as the decision of 
investigating judges to grant or refuse 
their satisfaction. 
The conducted research gives us 
grounds to propose the following algo-
rithm whereby the investigating judge, 
or the investigator who drafts it, should 
resolve the following questions: 
1) what is the purpose of interfering 
with a person’s right;
2) whether the purpose of interfer-
ing with a person’s right is legitimate, 
that is, whether it is provided by law; 
3) whether the purpose can be 
achieved through the seizure of prop-
erty, whether it is reasonable, appropri-
ate and necessary for the achievement 
of that purpose, and whether the evi-
dence is necessary;
4) whether there is any other means 
less burdensome than the seizure of 
property by which this purpose can be 
achieved;
5) whether the means used are pro-
portionate to the purpose which the 
state wishes to achieve;
6) whether the degree of restriction 
of the person’s right they wish to 
achieve is proportionate.
The proposed questions give reason 
to conclude on a three-stage solution to 
these issues. In the first stage, the first 
two questions concerning the definition 
of purpose are solved. In the second 
stage, the third and fourth questions 
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concerning the choice of a means of re-
striction are addressed. Finally, the third 
stage addresses the issue of proportional-
ity between the right of the individual 
and the purpose to be achieved. 
The legitimacy of the purpose is es-
tablished based on the requirements of 
the legislation. A measure which is ob-
jectively necessary in the presence of 
certain grounds and conditions is reason-
able. Suitable is a means by which the 
desired purpose can be achieved. The 
means is necessary, if there is no other, 
equally suitable, but less burdensome 
person, and it is necessary to solve an 
urgent social problem. When, of all the 
means by which a legitimate purpose can 
be achieved, it is the most appropriate 
one, it is capable of ensuring its achieve-
ment as effectively as possible. Propor-
tional may be the means to which the 
burden is imposed on the individual, 
given all the circumstances and risks will 
be commensurate with the purpose to be 
attained in the application of this restric-
tion and also of benefit to society. That 
is, it is necessary to “weigh” the degree 
of influence that a person should exert 
on the one hand, and the public interest 
protected by the state on the other one. 
In other words, the benefits to society of 
applying this measure are obvious and 
more important than the burdens a per-
son carries. It is also necessary to deter-
mine the degree of intensity of influence 
on the person, since when seized prop-
erty may be different. Not only the 
achievement of the purpose but also the 
gravity of the crime committed, the risks 
involved and the person to whom the 
measure is applied are to be taken into 
account. Finally, one can then conclude 
whether the desired result, taking into 
account all the conditions analyzed, is 
commensurate with the restriction of a 
person’s right to peaceful possession of 
property. 
In our opinion, our model of argu-
mentation is universal, capable in the 
decision to arrest property to restrict the 
discretion of the law enforcer, to protect 
a person from arbitrariness of public au-
thorities, and also to become a method-
ological basis in making a criminal pro-
cedural decision. 
The algorithm developed seems to be 
capable of resolving the value conflict 
arising from the use of property arrest as 
a measure of criminal proceedings re-
lated to the possibility of interfering with 
bodies conducting criminal proceedings 
in a law guaranteed by the Constitution 
of Ukraine (Article 41), the Convention 
and its Protocol No. 1, as well as the CPC 
(Article 16) by determining such a cor-
relation between the legitimate purpose 
of the intervention and the extent of the 
intervention, which will strike a balance 
between the values protected by law, be-
tween which there is a conflict as a result 
of such intervention. 
The proposed approaches, on the one 
hand, will ensure the inviolability of 
property rights and, on the other, the pos-
sibility of restricting them in necessary 
cases, while ensuring the priority of hu-
man rights and the proportionality of 
such restrictions. 
Conclusions. Property arrest is a 
measure of ensuring criminal proceed-
ings, during which the interference with 
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peaceful possession of property is inter-
fered with, which is protected by the 
Constitution of Ukraine and internation-
al legal acts. Against this background, it 
is inevitable to raise awareness of the 
criteria for the legitimacy of the person’s 
rights restriction in criminal proceed-
ings, as well as their widespread incor-
poration into law enforcement practice. 
Such criteria have been developed, based 
on the provisions of the Convention, Art. 
1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR, in the 
ECHR’s case-law, and were called the 
“three-part test”, the elements of which 
are to analyze the legitimacy of an inter-
ference with a person’s right, legitimate 
purpose, and address the need for such 
interference in a democratic society, its 
proportionality to the purpose that the 
state wants to achieve. 
The analysis of such criteria becomes 
even more relevant due to the fact that 
Art. 173 of the CPC provides that, in 
deciding whether to arrest property, the 
court should take into account, inter alia, 
the reasonableness and proportionality 
of the restriction of property to the task 
of criminal proceedings, and to apply the 
least aggravated method of arrest which 
will not result in the suspension or undue 
restriction of the person’s legitimate 
business activity or other consequences 
which have a significant effect on the 
interests of others. Thus, the domestic 
legislator tried to unify the international 
legal standards contained in Art. 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 of the CPC and national 
practice in order to ensure the rights of 
the person the property of which is seized 
are respected. 
National judges are gradually accept-
ing the ECHR legislation and practices, 
but most often the standard reasoning is 
generally used when deciding on a sei-
zure request for property arrest; the con-
tents of the relevant articles of the CPC 
are provided without attempting to rea-
son and to give detailed and substanti-
ated grounds for satisfying or denying 
the petition. Meanwhile, it is important 
to have a proper systematic, logical, con-
sistent argument, which is generally 
lacking in the rulings. 
The model of gradual logical argu-
mentation, developed and proposed by 
the authors of the article, is universal, 
capable of restricting the discretion of 
the law enforcer in the decision to arrest 
property, to protect the person from ar-
bitrariness of public authorities, and also 
to become a methodological basis for 
making a criminal procedural decision.
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